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Judicial Fact-Finding at Sentencing 
Stephanos Bibas 
Professor 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
In the eighteenth century, most criminal convictions carried fixed, automatic penalties of 
death, fines, or corporal punishments such as whipping. From the nineteenth century through the 
most of the twentieth, however, imprisonment replaced most capital and corporal punishment. 
Once a jury convicted, the sentencing judge had broad, unreviewable discretion to sentence a 
defendant to any term of years from probation up to the statutory maximum sentence. Judges 
could decide on their own, based on hearsay or other incompetent evidence, that defendants’s 
criminal past, bad character, or especially brutal or harmful crimes merited heavier sentences. 
These findings enjoyed none of the procedural protections of trial, such as jury findings beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The idea was that judges were like doctors or therapists, making forward-
looking diagnoses of individual defendants’s need for rehabilitation that were distinct from the 
jury’s backward-looking assessments of historical fact and blame. 
In the 1970s, the public and politicians concluded that rehabilitation was not working, 
and the dominant purpose of sentencing swung from forward-looking rehabilitation to backward-
looking retribution or punishment, based on the seriousness of the crime and the criminal. 
Around the same time, legislatures and sentencing commissions began to structure judges’s 
sentencing discretion by specifying that if a judge found certain facts, those facts would raise or 
lower a minimum or maximum sentence. These enhancements required no jury nor finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt, though these new sentencing rules offered more structure and 
procedural protections than the old ones had. 
The Impact of Apprendi 
Throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court refused to require trial protections 
at sentencing. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), it endorsed the medical model of 
judges as sentencing therapists unfettered by criminal procedures or the rules of evidence. But in 
2000, the Court reversed direction. A judge raised Charles Apprendi’s sentence for gun 
possession beyond the ten-year ordinary maximum to twelve years based on the judge’s finding, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Apprendi had fired the gun with a racially biased 
purpose. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Court struck down this 
enhancement in a five-to-four opinion, holding that the Sixth Amendment and the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment regulate sentence enhancements. Thus, the prosecution 
must prove any fact that raises a defendant’s legal maximum sentence (except for recidivism) to 
a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Court’s coalition was unusual: liberal Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined conservative Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas to form 
the majority. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens articulated three main reasons for the new 
rule: First, historically judges in the eighteenth century enjoyed no sentencing discretion to 
increase maximum penalties, as most eighteenth-century felony sentences were fixed. As judicial 
sentencing discretion grew in the nineteenth century with the rise of ranges of imprisonment, 
judges continued to exercise discretion only within limits fixed by the jury’s verdict. The Court 
emphasized, however, that it did not question the persistence of broad judicial discretion, so long 
as it remained within the legislative sentencing ranges. Second, judicial sentence enhancements 
risked being unfair to defendants, giving them inadequate notice of the penalties they faced. And 
third, the Court feared a slippery slope would continue to erode the right to a jury trial, as 
legislatures could take elements of crimes away from juries and recharacterize them as 
sentencing factors to be found by judges. Thus, the conservatives’s desire for a historically 
grounded bright-line rule dovetailed with the liberals’s concerns about unfairness and due 
process. 
The dissenters, led by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, pointed out that the majority’s 
history was inconclusive and did not clearly constitutionalize this novel rule. After all, sentence 
enhancements simply did not exist until recently, and they provide more structure and 
protections than do broad sentencing ranges and unfettered judicial discretion. The dissenters 
noted that the majority’s formalistic rule would be easy to evade. Legislatures could simply raise 
all sentencing maxima and then recast aggravating factors (such as burglary at night, which 
would ordinarily raise the maximum sentence) as mitigating ones (such as burglary during the 
day, which could lower the maximum). Finally, the dissenters feared that the majority would 
extend its rule to regulate not only statutory maximum sentences, but also sentencing guidelines. 
Justice Stephen Breyer’s separate dissent emphasized the need for guidelines and sentencing 
commissions, in order to promote sentencing equality and expertise; he lamented the likelihood 
that sentences would become more arbitrary or even discriminatory if Apprendi were to 
invalidate them. 
After Apprendi 
Indeed, four years later the Court extended its Apprendi holding to regulate facts that 
raise maximum sentences under sentencing guidelines, in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004). And in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Court held that binding federal 
sentencing guidelines violated the Apprendi rule. One would have thought that the remedy would 
be to require juries, not judges, to find all facts that raise sentences under the guidelines—
perhaps via long special-verdict forms, as the four Booker dissenters advocated. Surprisingly, 
however, the Court instead solved the constitutional defect by invalidating the guidelines’s 
binding force and making them more or less advisory. Appellate courts may still review district 
courts’s decisions to sentence within or outside the guidelines on procedural and substantive 
grounds, and they may presume that sentences within the guidelines range are reasonable: Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. ___ (2007). The Court is still working out, however, how much weight 
district and appellate courts must, or may, give to the guidelines, and how freely they may 
deviate from them without fear of appellate reversal. 
Apprendi and its progeny are truly landmarks, meriting metaphors such as tsunami, tidal 
wave, and number-ten earthquake. Tens of thousands of defendants and prisoners have raised 
Apprendi and especially Blakely claims, snarling courts in years of litigation. Dozens of states 
have rewritten their sentencing laws as a result. Yet after all this litigation, it is hard to see 
profound changes in sentencing law and practice.
One paradox is that the oft-criticized federal sentencing guidelines have survived, like 
some horror-movie character who refuses to die. Though the federal guidelines are supposedly 
advisory, Booker leaves them with much gravitational force, and sentencing judges continue to 
crunch their numbers and follow them, with little input from juries and without proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Conversely, Blakely invalidated many state sentencing guidelines, though they 
are more flexible and more widely praised. 
A second paradox is that while this line of cases began as a crusade to restore the role of 
the jury, it has turned into a campaign to restore judicial sentencing discretion. (This is much as 
Justice O’Connor’s Apprendi dissent predicted. Because Apprendi regulates only binding 
structured sentencing, legislatures or courts can get around it simply by loosening the rules and 
declaring them advisory rather than strict maxima.) Rather than creating a new, larger role for 
juries at sentencing, the Court has used Booker and Rita as vehicles for returning traditional 
sentencing discretion to judges. 
A third, related paradox is that in only a few short years, these cases have moved far from 
their constitutional roots. In Justice Scalia and Thomas’s eyes, Apprendi was an effort to shore 
up the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee with a bright-line rule and significantly more jury 
fact-finding. On this view, binding sentencing guidelines are an unconstitutional innovation if 
judges run them, so juries must play a much larger role. But Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Souter seem less concerned with the historical role of juries than with fairness to defendants. The 
result is that recent cases such as Rita focus primarily on the policy question of how much 
judicial discretion is enough to ensure needed flexibility and very little on the important role that 
juries should play at sentencing as well as at trial. The bright-line Sixth Amendment guarantee, 
which threatened to turn all sentencing into a second heavily regulated trial, has morphed into a 
fuzzy due process assessment: once a sentencing judge has a certain degree of flexibility, a 
sentencing maximum is no longer a maximum and triggers no special procedures. Apprendi’s 
legacy is to create a Sixth Amendment dichotomy, in which some sentencing facts require the 
full-blown trial protections of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while the rest require 
no procedural safeguards. There is neither middle ground nor sliding scale. 
Finally, these trial-focused rules miss the boat. More than 95 percent of criminal cases 
end in guilty pleas, which bypass these procedural protections by admitting sentencing facts. The 
Court’s solicitude for the few jury trials ignores the overwhelming numbers of guilty pleas and 
the greater need for due process at that stage. 
The Court could instead have pursued a different, more fruitful path. The Court did not 
have to force sentencing factors into the same constitutional boxes as elements of crimes, nor try 
to divine some nonexistent clear rule in the sparse text and history of the Sixth Amendment. 
Instead, the Court could have explicitly weighed the due process need for regulating the under-
regulated sentencing phase. This approach would have led to more flexible, sensible weighing of 
the need for confrontation, cross-examination, rules of evidence, double jeopardy, and proof by a 
preponderance or clear and convincing evidence at sentencing.  The Court, however, shows no 
signs of turning around to explore this path not taken. 
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